

CONFIDENTIAL

26 January 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence *(B)*

SUBJECT : Reinvestigation of Employees

REFERENCE : Memo to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from the Director of Security dated 30 November 1960

DOC	2	REV DATE	27 Apr 60	BY	025281
ORIG COMP	31	OPI	31	TYPE	02
ORIG CLASS	2	PAGES	2	REV CLASS	C
JUST	22	NEXT REV	2010	AUTHI	HR 70-2

1. I am in accord with the proposal presented by the Office of Security for reinvestigation of employees. However, I am concerned with the method in which this proposal is placed on the record at this time, inasmuch as the Agency has given the impression that this has been our practice since the submission of the Doolittle Report of October 1, 1955. You will recall that among the recommendations of this report was one to the effect that the Agency devise a system to insure that all employees were re-checked at least once every five years. The Agency agreed with this recommendation and when the President's Board of Consultants was established in January 1956, we reported to them that such a procedure was now in effect. The wording of this memo would make it appear that we are only now, some five years later, devising such a procedure.

2. I concur with all of the plan presented in paragraph 2 of the referenced memo, although I would not make it mandatory that a polygraph be given in each case. In fact, I would suggest that the polygraph be used only if there is evidence which needs to be clarified by such examination. Furthermore, I believe that it should be a policy in most, if not in all instances, senior employees, female employees and others on whom there is no new information developed by name checks, etc., be excluded from the polygraph.

3. Paragraph 2.1. gives the impression that there is security information in the files of the Director of Personnel, Director of Training and the Chief of Medical Staff. I was under the impression that all security information was kept in the Security Office and that the files of these other offices would contain exclusively suitability information. Further, I question the wisdom of circulating outside of the Security Office lists of names of employees

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

being reinvestigated. Perhaps it would be better if officers of the Security Office went to these offices and personally checked the files rather than having them reviewed by non-security personnel.

4. Finally, I concur with the comment of the DD/S which would suggest that the Office of Security absorb all of the additional cost of this program.



25X1A

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Inspector General

cc: Dir/Security via DD/S

CONFIDENTIAL